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Abstract.	  Continuing	  the	  work	  of	  Rabin	  and	  Rivest	  [1]	  we	  present	  another	  simple	  
and	  fast	  method	  for	  conducting	  end	  to	  end	  voting	  and	  allowing	  public	  verification	  
of	  correctness	  of	  the	  announced	  vote	  tallying	  results.	  This	  method	  was	  referred	  to	  
in	   [1]	   as	   the	   SV/VCP	   method.	   	   In	   the	   present	   note	   voter	   privacy	   protection	   is	  
achieved	  by	  use	  of	  a	  simple	  form	  of	  Multi	  Party	  Computations	  (MPC).	  At	  the	  end	  
of	   vote	   tallying	   process,	   random	   permutations	   of	   the	   cast	   votes	   are	   publicly	  
posted	   in	   the	   clear,	   without	   identification	   of	   voters	   or	   ballot	   ids.	   Thus	   vote	  
counting	  and	  assurance	  of	  correct	  form	  of	  cast	  votes	  are	  directly	  available.	  Also,	  a	  
proof	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  revealed	  votes	  are	  a	  permutation	  of	  the	  concealed	  cast	  
votes	  is	  publicly	  posted	  and	  verifiable	  by	  any	  interested	  party.	  
Advantages	   of	   this	   method	   are:	   Easy	   understandability	   by	   non-­‐cryptographers,	  
implementers	  and	  ease	  of	  use	  by	  voters	  and	  election	  officials.	  Direct	  handling	  of	  
complicated	  ballot	  forms.	  Independence	  from	  any	  specialized	  primitives.	  Speed	  of	  
vote-­‐tallying	  and	  correctness	  proving:	  elections	   involving	  a	  million	  voters	  can	  be	  
tallied	  and	  proof	  of	  correctness	  of	  results	  posted	  within	  a	  few	  minutes.	  
Introduction	  and	  Infrastructure	  
The	  method	  of	  vote	  tallying	  and	  correctness	  proving	  described	  in	  this	  note	  can	  be	  
used	   in	   conjunction	   with	   any	   one	   of	   the	   vote	   casting,	   paper	   copy	   of	   vote	   and	  
paper	  receipt	  for	  voter	  described	  in	  [1];	  see	  that	  paper	  for	  additional	  context.	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Votes	  and	  values	  used	  in	  the	  system	  are	  described	  by	  integers	  x	  <	  M	  where,	  say,	  
M	  =	  100.	  	  
In	  the	  following,	  additions	  and	  subtractions	  of	  values	  are	  performed	  mod	  M;	  we	  
illustrate	  with	  M	  =	  100.	  	  Thus	  38	  +	  80	  =	  18;	  (	  –	  17)	  =	  83.	  
The	   voter	   casts	   her	   vote	   in	   a	   Voting	   Booth	   by	   use	   of	   a	   Tablet.	   The	   vote	   is	  
transferred	  to	  a	  computer	  in	  the	  Voting	  Station.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  election-­‐day	  Voting	  
stations	  transfer	  the	  votes	  to	  a	  Tally	  Server	  (TS)	  at	  the	  Vote	  Tallying	  Center	  (VTC).	  
The	  VTC	  also	  has	  a	  Proof	  Server	  (PS)	  which	  will	  prepare	  a	  publicly	  verifiable	  proof	  
of	   the	   correctness	   of	   the	   election	   results	   announced	   by	   the	   TS.	   The	   proof	   of	  
correctness	   will	   be	   publicly	   posted	   by	   the	   PS	   on	   an	   electronic	   Secure	   Bulletin	  
Board	  (SBB)	  accessible	  to	  voters,	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  election,	  and	  the	  general	  
public.	  
In	   this	   note,	   to	   achieve	   high	   assurance	   of	   voter	   privacy	   the	   PS	   consists	   of	   nine	  
independent	  devices	  P1,j	  ,	  P2,j	  ,	  P3,j	   	   ,	  j	  =	  1,	  2	  ,3	  (considered	  as	  three	  rows	  of	  three	  
devices	  each).	  	  It	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  as	  long	  as	  no	  more	  than	  two	  devices	  
leak	   out	   information,	   privacy	   of	   voters	   is	   protected.	   	   Generalizations	   for	   other	  
parameterizations	  will	  be	  described	  later.	  
The	   proof	   of	   correctness	   assures	   the	   correctness	   of	   the	   announced	   election	  
results	  no	  matter	  how	  the	  devices	  acted.	  
The	  system	  uses	  three	  pairs	  (ej	  ,	  dj)	  of	  a	  Public	  Key	  Encryption	  method	  (PKE),	  for	  j	  
=	  1,	  2,	  3.	  	  Here	  ej	  is	  a	  public	  encryption	  key,	  and	  dj	  is	  the	  secret	  decryption	  key.	  
It	  also	  uses	  a	  commitment	   function	   	  COM(K,	  u)	   	  employing	  a	   (randomly	  chosen)	  
key	  K	  to	  commit	  to	  value	  u.	   	  COM	  can	  be	   implemented,	  say,	  by	  use	  of	  AES	  with	  	  
256	  bit	  keys.	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  COM	  is	  computationally	  hiding:	  given	  the	  value	  C	  =	  
COM(K,	  u),	  it	  is	  infeasible	  to	  gain	  any	  information	  about	  u.	  It	  also	  assumed	  that	  it	  
is	  computationally	  infeasible	  to	  find	  two	  pairs	  (K,	  u)	  ≠	  (K’,	  u’)	  such	  that	  COM(K,	  u)	  
=	   COM(K’,	   u’).	   This	   renders	   the	   commitment	   by	   COM	   to	   be	   computationally	  
binding.	  A	  commitment	  C	  can	  be	  opened	  in	  only	  one	  way.	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Every	  Voter	  Tablet	  has	  all	  public	  encryption	  keys	  ej,	  j	  =	  1,	  2,	  3.	  	  Every	  Pj,1	  has	  the	  
secret	  decryption	  key	  dj	  .	  
The	   Voter’s	   Tablet	   takes	   the	   Voter’s	   V	   vote	  w	   and	   randomly	   represents	  w	   as	   a	  
triple	  (x,y,z)	  such	  that	  	  	  
w	  =	  (x	  +	  y	  +	  z)	  mod	  M.	  	  
It	  then	  creates	  random	  vector	  representations	  of	  x,	  y,	  and	  z	  as	  	  
X	  =	  (u1	  ,	  v1)	  	  	  where	  Val(X)	  =	  (u1	  +	  v1)	  mod	  M	  =	  x;	  	  
Y	  =	  (u2,	  v2)	  	   where	  Val(Y)	  =	  (u2	  +	  v2)	  mod	  M	  =	  y;	  	  
Z	  =	  (u3	  ,	  v3)	   where	  Val(Z)	  =	  (u3	  +	  v3)	  mod	  M	  =	  z.	  	  
Tablet	  chooses	  for	  X	  random	  keys	  K1	  ,	  K2	  	  and	  sends	  to	  P1,1	  via	  the	  Voting	  Station	  
the	  ballot	  representation	  consisting	  of	  
	   Ballot	  id	  (BLTid)	  
COMSV(X)	  =	  (COM(K1,	  u1),	  COM(K2	  ,	  v1))	  
PKE(e1	  ,	  K1	  ||	  K2	  )).	  	  
Similar	  messages	  are	  sent	  to	  P2,1,	  P3,1	  using	  different	  pairs	  of	  random	  keys	  for	  each	  
commitment,	  and	  using	  e2	  for	  encrypting	  for	  P2,1,	  and	  e3	  for	  encryption	  for	  P3,1.	  	  	  
In	  this	  way	  the	  Tablet	  sends	  a	  portion	  of	  a	  distributed	  representation	  of	  vote	  w	  to	  
the	   first	   device	   in	   each	   row	   (each	   portion	   being	   a	   commitment	   to	   a	   split-­‐value	  
representation	  of	  a	  share	  of	  w,	  where	  the	  shares	  add	  up	  to	  w	  modulo	  M).	  
We	  assume	  that	  there	  are	  n	  voters	  and	  that	  the	  system	  uses	  some	  convention	  for	  
providing	  each	  ballot	  with	  a	  unique	  ballot	  id,	  BLTid.	  
All	   ballot	   information	   received	   from	   Tablets	   is	   publicly	   posted	   on	   the	   public	  
Secure	   Bulletin	   Board,	   so	   that	   voters	   may	   confirm	   their	   correct	   reception.	   	   To	  
simplify	   procedures,	   a	   voter	   is	   given	   the	   ballot	   id	   BLTid	   of	   her	   vote,	   and	   the	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postings	  may	   be	   in	   order	   of	   ballot	   id.	   	   The	   voter	  may	   have	   a	   receipt	   from	   the	  
Tablet	  giving	  the	  hash	  of	  what	  should	  be	  posted,	  to	  simplify	  comparisons.	  
Now	  each	  P1,1,	  P2,1	  ,	  P3,1	  ,	  each	  using	  its	  private	  decryption	  key,	  internally	  opens	  its	  
received	  commitments.	  	  
Remark.	   The	   slowest	   computation	   in	   the	   above	   is	   PKE	   decryption.	   	   A	   simple	  
hybrid	  encryption	  method	  to	  set	  up	  private	  symmetric	  keys	  employing	  only	  one	  
PKE	  decryption	  by	  the	  Proof	  Server	  per	  Tablet	  may	  be	  used	  to	  reduce	  the	  overall	  
PKE	  decryption	  time	  significantly.	  	  	  	  
Overall	  Plan.	  	  The	  Multi-­‐Party	  Proof	  Server	  	  P1,j	  ,	  P2,j	  ,	  P3,j	  ,	  j	  =	  1,	  2	  ,3	  	  will	  create	  and	  
publicly	   post	  m	   arrays	   of	   length	   n	   each	   of	  which	   is,	   verifiably,	   a	   secret	   random	  
permutation	  of	  the	  votes	  w1	  ,	  …,	  wn	  in	  the	  clear.	  	  
This	  will	  be	  achieved	  by	  transforming	  the	  n	  concealed	  cast	  votes	   into	  2m	  arrays	  
each	   of	   length	   n	   and	   each	   consisting	   of	   a	   different	   random	  permutation	   of	   the	  
votes	   re-­‐concealed	   by	   the	   Proof	   Server.	   The	   number	   2m	   used	   depends	   on	   the	  
degree	  of	  correctness	  assurance	  the	  system	  is	  designed	  to	  achieve.	  It	  will	  be	  seen,	  
following	   Theorem	   2	   in	   Section	   5,	   that	   for	   example	   2m=24	   provides	   very	   high	  
assurance.	  
Cut	   and	   Choose.	   m	   of	   the	   2m	   arrays	   will	   be	   randomly	   selected,	   posted	   in	   the	  
original	  order	  of	  the	  cast	  votes	  and	  proven	  to	  conceal	  the	  same	  vote	  values	  as	  the	  
array	  of	  cast	  votes.	  
Each	  of	  the	  remaining	  m	  arrays	  will	  be	  opened	  in	  its	  permuted	  order	  to	  reveal	  a	  
permutation	  of	  the	  votes	  w1	  ,	  …,	  wn	  	  .	  
The	  required	  computations	  by	  the	  Proof	  Server	  are	  additions	  mod	  M	  of	   integers	  
of	  size	  at	  most	  M,	  and	  concealment	  of	  integers	  u	  of	  size	  at	  most	  M	  as	  COM(K,	  u)	  
by	  any	  fast	  commitment	  function	  COM(	  ,	  ).	  These	  computations	  are	  done	  on	  the	  
individual	  Pi,j	   	   and	  not	   in	  a	  multi-­‐party	   fashion.	  They	  are	  executable	  on	  ordinary	  
desk	  top	  computers	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  millions	  of	  operations	  per	  second.	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1. Split	  Value	  Representations	  of	  Values	  and	  Proofs	  of	  Equality	  
The	  method	  of	  Sections	  1-­‐2	  follow	  [Rabin	  et-­‐al,	  2]	  ,	  [Micali,	  Rabin,	  3].	  
Let	  0	  ≤	  x	  <	  M	  be	  a	  value.	  A	  random	  split	  value	  representation	  of	  x	  is	  a	  vector	  X	  =	  (u,	  
v)	  where	  u	  is	  randomly	  chosen	  from	  [0,	  M	  –	  1]	  and	  v	  =	  (x	  –	  u)	  mod	  M.	  Thus	  Val(X)	  
=	  (u	  +v)	  mod	  M	  =	  x.	  
A	  commitment	  COMSV(X)	  to	  a	  vector	  X	  =	  (u,	  v)	  is	  a	  pair	  of	  commitments,	  one	  to	  
each	   component:	   COMSV(X)	   =	   (COM(K1,	   u),	   COM(K2,	   v)).	   Note	   that	   COMSV(X)	  
denotes	  commitment	  to	  a	  split-­‐value	  vector	  representation	  of	  a	  value	  x,	  0	  ≤	  x	  <	  M,	  
while	  COM(K,u	  )	  is	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  value	  u,	  0	  ≤	  u	  <	  M.	  
If	  just	  one	  of	  the	  two	  coordinates	  u	  or	  v	  in	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  random	  split	  value	  
representation	  X	  of	  a	  value	  x	   is	  opened	   in	  a	  proof	  process,	   then	  no	   information	  
about	  the	  value	  x	  is	  revealed.	  
We	  now	  begin	  to	  consider	  triplets	  (or	  later,	  tuples)	  of	  split-­‐value	  representations.	  
Let	  X=	  (u1	  ,v1	  ),	  Y	  =	  (u2	  ,v2	  ),	  Z	  =	  (u3	  ,v	  ).	  Let	  X’=	  (u’1	  ,v’1	  ),Y’	  =	  (u’2	  ,v’2	  ),	  Z’	  =	  (u’3	  ,	  v’3	  ).	  	  
Clearly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Val(X)	   +	   Val(Y)	   +	   Val(Z)	   =	   	   Val(X’)	   +	   Val(Y’)	   +	   Val(Z’)	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  
if	  and	  only	  if	  there	  exists	  a	  value	  t	  such	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  X	  +	  Y	  +	  Z	  =	  X’	  +	  Y’	  +	  Z’	  +	  (t,	  -­‐t).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  
Assume	   that	   a	   Prover	   has	   posted	   on	   a	   SBB	   six	   commitments,	   COMSV(X),	  
COMSV(Y),	  …,	  COMSV(Z’),	   and	  claims	   that	   (1)	  holds.	  He	  can	  post	  a	  proof	  of	   this	  
claim	  as	  follows:	  
1. Prover	  posts	  and	  signs	  a	  value	  t.	  
2. By	  means	  of	  independent	  randomness	  (see	  Section	  3),	  a	  random	  	  c	  ϵ	  {	  1,	  2}	  
is	  created	  and	  posted	  on	  the	  SBB.	  
3. If	   c	   =	   1,	   Prover	   opens	   the	   first	   commitments	   in	   COMSV(X),	   COMSV(Y),	  
COMSV(Z),	  COMSV(X’),	  COMSV(Y’),	  COMSV(Z’),	  	  	  revealing	  and	  posting	  	  u1	  ,	  
u2	  	  ,	  u3	  ,	  	  u’1	  ,	  u’2	  ,	  u’3	  .	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4. Similarly,	  if	  c	  =	  2,	  Prover	  opens	  the	  second	  commitments.	  	  	  
5. A	  Verifier	  viewing	  the	  posted	  proof	  will	  check	  that	  the	  commitments	  were	  
correctly	  opened.	  If	  c	  =	  1	  the	  verifier	  will	  check	  and	  accept	  only	  if	  	  (u1	  +	  u2	  	  +	  
u3	  )	  mod	  M	  =	  (u’1	  +	  u’2	  +	  u’3	  +	  t	  )	  mod	  M.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  c	  =	  2,	  now	  using	  –t.	  
Lemma.	  If	  	  (1)	  is	  false	  then	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  posted	  proof	  will	  be	  accepted	  
is	  ≤	  ½.	  
Proof.	  If	  the	  claim	  (1)	  is	  false	  then	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  equations	  mentioned	  in	  the	  
Bullet	  5	  above	   is	   false.	  The	   random	  choice	  of	  c	  will	   reveal	  a	   false	  equation	  with	  
probability	  at	  least	  ½.	  Q.E.D.	  
2. Proving	  Equality	  of	  Arrays	  of	  Vote	  Values	  
In	  our	  mechanism	  votes	  are	  represented	  by	  triplets	  T	  =	  (X,	  Y,	  Z)	  and	  committed	  to	  
as	  COMT(T)	  =	  (COMSV(X),	  COMSV(Y),	  COMSV(Z)).	  	  By	  definition,	  Val(T)	  =	  (Val(X)	  +	  
Val(Y)	  +	  Val(Z))	  mod	  M.	  
Assume	  that	  a	  Prover	  has	  posted	   in	  a	  SBB	  two	  arrays	  of	  commitments	  to	   triplet	  
representations	  of	  values:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  COMT(T1)	  ,	  COMT(T2)	  ,	  …,	  COMT(Tn)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  COMT(T’1),	  COMT(T’2),	  …,	  COMT(T’n)	  .	  
The	  Prover	  claims	  that	  	  Val(Tj)	  =	  Val(T’j)	  	  for	  	  1	  ≤	  	  j	  	  ≤	  n.	  
To	  post	   a	  proof	  of	   correctness	  on	   the	  SBB,	   the	  Prover	  posts	   the	   values	   t1,	  …,	   tn	  
required	  for	  proving	  the	  claimed	  equalities.	  
Afterwards,	  employing	  independent	  randomness	  (see	  Section	  3),	  n	  random	  values	  
cj	  ϵ	  {1,	  2},	  1	  ≤	  	  j	  	  ≤	  n,	  are	  computed	  and	  posted.	  
Now	   a	   proof	   for	   each	   claimed	   equality	   Val(Tj)	   =	   Val(T’j),	   1	   ≤	   	   j	   	   ≤	   n,	   is	   created,	  
posted	  and	  can	  be	  verified	  along	  the	  lines	  in	  the	  above	  3-­‐5	  and	  Proof	  Verification	  
given	  above.	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Theorem	  1.	   If	  more	   than	   k	   of	   the	   claimed	  n	   value	   equalities	   are	   false	   then	   the	  
probability	  of	  acceptance	  of	  the	  claim	  is	  at	  most	  (½)k	  .	  	  
This	  theorem	  follows	  directly	  from	  the	  Lemma.	  
	  
3. Randomness	  
The	   PS	   will	   require	   two	   types	   of	   randomness	   for	   preparing	   its	   posted	   proof	   of	  
correctness	  of	  posted	  tally	  results.	  
Internal	   randomness.	  As	  will	   be	   seen	   in	   Section	  5,	   the	  PS	  will	   prepare	   and	  post	  
additional	   arrays	   of	   commitments	   to	   vector	   representations	   of	   the	   votes	   and	  
random	   permutations	   of	   these	   arrays.	   This	   will	   require	   randomness	   for	   the	  
creation	  of	  the	  commitments	  and	  of	  the	  permutations.	  The	  PS	  will	  use	  for	  these	  
tasks	  internally	  generated	  randomness.	  
Random	  challenges.	  Zero	  Knowledge	  Proofs	   (ZKP)	   involve	   random	  challenges.	   In	  	  
Interactive	   ZKPs	   the	   random	   challenges	   are	   created	   by	   a	   Verifier	   who,	   ideally,	  
uses	  physical	  generation	  of	  randomness.	  
We	  want	  Non-­‐Interactive	  proofs	  of	  correctness	  which	  will	  be	  posted	   for	  general	  
verification.	   Thus	   the	   random	   challenges	   will	   be	   created	   by	   computing	   hash	  
functions	   on	   posted	   array	   data.	   This	   idea	   goes	   back	   to	   Fiat-­‐Shamir.	   Strictly	  
speaking	  our	  proofs	  are	  not	  ZKP,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  go	  into	  the	  issue	  of	  theoretically	  
classifying	  them	  
To	  prevent	  the	  PS	  from	  privately	  creating	  data	  and	  extracting	  randomness	  until	  it	  
can	   cheat,	   the	   hash	   operation	   incorporates	   a	   seed	   that	   a	   trusted	   outside	  
committee	  prepares	  and	  hands	  over	   to	   the	  PS	  only	  after	   the	  posting.	  There	  are	  
various	  ways	  of	  implementing	  this	  creation	  of	  random	  challenges.	  
The	   above	   mode	   of	   course	   only	   creates	   pseudo-­‐random	   challenges.	   In	   the	  
Theorems	   that	   follow	   we	   disregard	   this	   point	   and	   state	   the	   results	   as	   if	   truly	  
random	  challenges	  were	  employed.	  
4. Obfuscating	  and	  Shuffling	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P1,1	  has	  publicly	  posted,	  in	  order	  of	  the	  BLTids,	  the	  pairs	  for	  the	  X-­‐components	  of	  
the	  n	  votes.	  
The	  Proof	  Server	  PS	  device	  P1,1	   	  has	   the	  secret	  decryption	  key	  d1.	   It	  decrypts	   for	  
each	  Ballot	  component	  X	  	  the	  PKE(ej	  ,	  K1	  ||	  K2	  )	  part.	  Using	  the	  keys	  K1,	  K2	  the	  PS	  
opens	  	  COMSV(X)	  	  and	  computes	  	  Val(X)	  =	  x.	  
Now	  P1,1	  	  has	  the	  sequence	  of	  X-­‐components	  of	  votes:	  x1,	  …	  ,	  xn	  .	  
Similarly	   P2,1	   	   computes	   y1,	   …,	   yn	   and	   P3,1	   computes	   z1,	   …,	   zn.	   	   Here	   the	   vote	   in	  
Ballot1	  	  =	  (x1	  +	  y1	  +	  z1)	  mod	  M.	  	  Voter	  privacy	  is	  protected	  since	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  
three	  devices	  ,	  say	  P1,1	  ,	  is	  not	  gossipy	  .	  
Definition.	  We	  say	  that	  S’1	  =	  (x’1,	  y’1,	  z’1)	  is	  an	  obfuscated	  form	  of	  S1	  =	  (x1,	  y1,	  z1)	  if	  
(x’1+	   y’1+	   z’1)	   mod	  M	   is	   equal	   to	   (x1	   +	   y1	   +	   z1)	   mod	  M	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   that	   is,	   if	   S’1	   and	   S1	  
represent	  the	  same	  value.	  
Obfuscating:	  The	  method	  for	  P1,1,	  P2,1	  ,	  P3,1	  	  to	  obfuscate	  S1	  =	  (x1,	  y1	  ,z1)	  is	  to	  chose	  
three	  random	  values	  p1,	  q1	  ,r1	  in	  the	  range	  0	  to	  M-­‐1,	  subject	  to	  (p1	  +	  q1	  +	  r1)	  mod	  
M	  =	  0	  and	  to	  compute	  x’1	  =	  (p1	  +	  x1	  )	  mod	  M	  by	  P1,1,	  etc.	  
Shuffling:	  P1,1	  has	  now	  opened	  x’1	  ,	  …	  ,	  x’n	  ,	  P2,1	  	  has	  opened	  y’1,	  …	  ,	  y’n	  and	  similarly	  
for	  P3,1	  .	  
Now	  P1,1,	  P2,1	  ,	  P3,1	  	  choose	  a	  random	  permutation	  π	  :	  {1,	  …	  ,	  n}	  →	  {1,	  …	  ,	  n}.	  
P1,1	   securely	   sends	   to	   P1,2	   the	   array	   (	   x’π(1),	   …	   ,	   x’π(n)	   )	   of	   obfuscated	   values,	   P2,1	  
securely	  sends	  to	  P2,2	  the	  array	  (	  y’π(1),	  …	  ,	  y’π(n)	  ),	  similarly	  for	  P3,1	  	  and	  P3,2	  .	  	  	  
Next	  P1,2,	  P2,2,	  P3,2	  again	  obfuscate	  and	  shuffle	   their	  arrays,	  using	  a	  new	  random	  
permutation	  π1	  and	  transfer	  the	  result	  to	  	  	  P1,3,	  P2,3,	  P3,3	  .	  
Finally,	  P1,3,	  P2,3,	  P3,3	  	  again	  obfuscate	  and	  shuffle	  so	  that	  P1,3	  has	  the	  array	  (x’’’σ(1),	  
…	  ,	  x’’’σ(n)	  ),	  similarly	  for	  P2,3	  and	  	  the	  array	  (y’’’σ(1),	  …	  ,	  y’’’σ(n)	  ),	  and	  for	  P3,3	  .	  Here	  σ	  
denotes	   the	   permutation	   of	   the	   original	   order	   of	   the	   ballots	   into	   the	   present	  
arrays.	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Maintenance	  of	  Voter	  Privacy:	  As	  long	  as	  no	  more	  than	  two	  of	  the	  nine	  devices	  Pi,j	  
leak	  out	  unintended	  data,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  one	  row	  and	  one	  column	  in	  the	  3×3	  
array	  of	  devices	  Pi,j	  that	  do	  not	  contain	  an	  improper	  device.	  
This,	  combined	  with	  the	  obfuscation	  and	  shuffling	  from	  one	  column	  of	  devices	  to	  
the	  next	  and	  the	  final	  obfuscation	  and	  shuffling	  by	  the	  third	  column	  P1,3,	  P2,3,	  P3,3	  	  	  	  
of	  devices,	  results	   in	  complete	  secrecy	  of	  votes	  by	   individual	  voters.	  This	  even	   if	  
the	  above	  output	  arrays	  of	  P1,3,	  P2,3,	  P3,3	  	  are	  made	  public	  and	  two	  devices	  of	  the	  
PS	   leak	   out	   all	   their	   data.	   We	   shall	   prove	   this	   statement	   following	   the	   next	  
remark.	   	   It	   is	  assumed	  about	   the	  Proof	  Server	   that	   the	  communication	  between	  
any	  two	  sub-­‐devices	  is	  secure.	  
Remark.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   if	   computations	   were	   properly	   done,	   then	   (x’’’σ(1)	   +	  
y’’’σ(1)	  +	  z’’’σ(1))	  mod	  M	  =	  wσ(1)	  ,etc.	  I.e.	  from	  the	  output	  arrays	  of	  P1,3,	  P2,3,	  P3,3	  	  ,	  	  the	  
σ	  permutation	  of	  the	  votes	  w1	  ,	  …,	  wn	  	  can	  be	  directly	  read	  off.	  
Proof	  of	  Statement:	  In	  first	  phase	  of	  obfuscation	  and	  shuffling	  going	  from	  the	  first	  
column	  P1,1	  ,	  P2,1	  ,	  P3,1	  	  to	  the	  second	  column	  P1,2,	  P2,2,	  P3,2,	  obfuscating	  a	  typical	  S1	  
=	  (x1	  ,	  y1	  ,z1	  )	  into	  S’1	  =	  (x’1,	  y’1,	  z’1	  )	  by	  use	  of	  p1	  ,	  q1	  ,	  r1	  .	  	  Note	  that	  P1,1	  keeps	  x1	  and	  
x’1	  in	  its	  own	  memory.	  	  Similarly	  for	  P2,1	  ,	  P3,1	  	  and	  their	  components	  of	  S1	  and	  S’1	  .	  
This	   implies	   that	   even	   though	   p1,	   q1,	   r1	   are	   known	   to	   all	   three	   of	   P1,1,	   P2,1,	   P3,1,	  
nothing	  is	  revealed	  about	  components/fragments	  of	  proper	  devices.	  
The	   same	  holds	   about	  obfuscation	   and	   shuffling	   going	   from	   the	   second	   column	  
P1,2,	  P2,2,	  P3,2,	  to	  the	  third	  column	  P1,3,	  P2,3,	  P3,3.	  
Once	   the	   third	   column	   P1,3,	   P2,3,	   P3,3	   is	   reached	   either	   it	   or	   one	   of	   the	   two	  
preceding	  columns	  do	  not	  contain	  any	  improper	  device.	  So	  the	  outputs	  posted	  by	  
the	  third	  column	  retain	  voter	  privacy.	  	  
5. Proof	  of	  Correctness	  
The	  device	  P1,3	  creates	  random	  	  split	  value	  vector	  representations	  X’’’σ(i)	  for	  xσ(i),	  1	  
≤	  	  i	  	  ≤	  n,	  and	  commitments	  COMSV(X’’’σ(i))	  for	  1	  ≤	  	  i	  	  ≤	  n.	  Similarly	  for	  P2,3	  with	  	  the	  
y’’’σ(i)	  ,	  and	  P3,3	  	  with	  the	  z’’’σ(i)	  .	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Using	  the	  notation	  of	  Section	  2,	  P1,3,	  P2,3,	  P3,3	  	  together	  prepare	  and	  publicly	  post:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  COMT(Tσ(i))	  =	  (COMSV(X’’’σ(i)),	  COMSV(Y’’’σ(i)),	  COMSV(Z’’’σ(i))),	  	  1	  ≤	  i	  ≤	  n.	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  
This	   process	   of	   obfuscation,	   shuffling	   and	   posting	   an	   array	   of	   the	   form	   (3)	   is	  
repeated	  by	   the	  PS	   2m	   times,	  where	   as	   stated	   in	   the	  Overall	   Plan,	  m	   is	   chosen	  
according	  to	  the	  desired	  assurance	  of	  correctness.	  Each	  of	  these	  posted	  arrays	  is	  
of	  course	  created	  by	  use	  of	  a	  different	  permutation.	  
Cut	  and	  Choose.	  Now	  by	  use	  of	   randomness	  extracted	   from	  all	   the	  posted	  data	  
together	   with	   an	   independent	   random	   seed,	   m	   of	   the	   posted	   arrays	   (3)	   are	  
randomly	   chosen	   for	   a	   proof	   of	   value-­‐consistency	   with	   the	   posted	   concealed	  
votes	  (see	  end	  of	  Introduction).	  
Each	  of	  these	  m	  chosen	  arrays	  (3)	  is	  rearranged	  by	  the	  Proof	  Server	  in	  the	  order	  of	  
of	  BLTids,	  hence	  in	  the	  order	  of	  the	  submitted-­‐posted	  concealed	  ballots.	  
Now	  the	  randomness	  is	  used	  to	  open	  in	  each	  of	  the	  commitments	  in	  the	  posted	  
concealed	   ballots	   and	   the	   corresponding	   commitment	   in	   each	   of	   the	   m	  
rearranged	  arrays	  (3)	  and	  prove	  equality	  of	  values	  by	  the	  method	  of	  Section	  2.	  By	  
Theorem	  1,	   if	  even	  one	  of	   these	  m	  arrays	  differs	   from	  the	  ballot	  array	  by	  more	  
than	  k	  values	  then	  the	  probability	  of	  acceptance	  is	  <	  (1/2)k.	  
For	  brevity	  we	  omit	  the	  simple	  details	  of	  how	  P1,3,	  P2,3,	  P3,3	  	  	  compute	  and	  post	  the	  
pairs	  (ti	  ,	  -­‐	  ti)	  ,	  1	  ≤	  	  i	  	  ≤	  n	  used	  in	  the	  	  proofs	  of	  value	  equality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Now	   all	   the	   other	  m	  permuted	   arrays	   are	   opened	   and	   the	   values	   are	   revealed.	  
Only	   if	   all	   opened	   arrays	   are	   permutations	   of	   the	   same	   values	   is	   the	   proof	   of	  
correctness	  accepted.	  	  
Call	  a	  permuted	  array	  of	  values	  k-­‐good	  if	  when	  re-­‐arranged	  in	  the	  order	  of	  posted	  
concealed	   ballots	   it	   differs	   from	   the	   concealed	   ballot	   values	   in	   fewer	   than	   k	  
locations.	  
Theorem	  2.	   The	  probability	   that	   the	  opened	  arrays	   (3)	   are	  permutations	  of	   the	  
same	   values	   but	   they	   are	   not	   k-­‐good,	   i.e.	   the	   probability	   of	   accepting	   an	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announced	  tally	  result	  differing	  from	  the	  correct	  tally	  by	  more	  than	  k	  vote	  values	  	  	  
is	  at	  most	  
	  	  	  	   1/C(2m,	  m)	  	  +	  1/2k	  	  ~	  	  sqrt(3.14	  m)/22m	  	  +	  1/2k	  	  	  
where	   C(2m,	   m)	   denotes	   the	   binomial	   coefficient	   “choose	   m	   out	   of	   2m”.	   	  We	  
postpone	  the	  proof	  to	  the	  full	  paper.	  	  
For	  the	  case	  of	  no	  more	  than	  20	  wrong	  votes	  we	  use	  2m	  =	  24	  and	  the	  probability	  
of	  accepting	  a	  proof	  of	  correctness	  while	  there	  are	  more	  than	  20	  discrepancies	  is	  
less	  than	  1.38/220.	  
	  
6. Countering	  Denial	  of	  Service	  Attacks	  (Device	  Failure)	  	  
	  
It	   is	   relatively	   straightforward,	   using	   well-­‐known	   secret-­‐sharing	   methods,	   to	  
provide	  increased	  robustness	  against	  the	  possibility	  that	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  proof	  
server	  devices	  may	  fail.	   	  These	  methods	  allow	  construction	  of	  systems	  satisfying	  
specified	  robustness	  requirements	  in	  addition	  to	  voter	  privacy	  protection.	  	  	  
When	   failures	  may	  occur,	   then	  obfuscation	   is	   done	  by	   the	  method	  of	   proactive	  
secret	  sharing,	  rather	  than	  the	  method	  described	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  previous	  
sections.	  	  	  
For	  example,	  suppose	  we	  wish	  to	  protect	  against	  one	  device	  failure	  and	  one	  leaky	  
device;	   we’ll	   use	   a	   PS	   with	   four	   rows	   and	   two	   columns.	   	   The	   votes	   are	   (4,	   3)-­‐
shared	  by	  the	  voter	  Tablet	  and	  the	  shares	  of	  each	  vote	  are	  securely	  sent	  to	  four	  
devices	  P[1,	  1],...,	  P[4,	  1]	  comprising	  the	  first	  column	  of	  the	  PS.	  	  With	  (4,3)-­‐secret-­‐
sharing	  each	  value	  is	  split	  into	  four	  shares,	  such	  that	  any	  three	  (but	  not	  any	  two)	  
suffice	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  value.	  
Every	   first-­‐column	   proof	   server	   P[j,	   1]	  	   (4,	   3)-­‐shares	   the	   value	   0	   among	   the	   4	  
devices	  in	  the	  first	  column.	  	  Every	  P[j	  ,	  1]	  adds	  the	  received	  shares	  of	  0	  to	  its	  input	  
share.	   	   (This	   is	  done	  separately	   for	  each	  vote.)	   	  The	   first	   column	  devices	   shuffle	  
the	  obfuscated	  quadruples	  and	  every	  P[j,	  1]	  sends	  its	  obfuscated	  share	  to	  P[j,	  2].	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The	   second	   column	   of	   the	   PS	   obfuscates	   and	   shuffles,	   produces	   the	   results	   as	  
output.	  	  	  
In	  general,	  if	  at	  most	  f	  devices	  may	  fail	  (where	  f	  >	  0)	  and	  at	  most	  l	  may	  be	  leaky,	  
then	  PS	  may	  have	  r	  rows	  and	  c	  columns,	  where	  r	  ≥	  f	  +	  l +	  2	  (to	  protect	  votes	  from	  
leaking),	  use	  an	  (r, l+2)	  secret-­‐sharing	  method,	  and	  choose	  c	  ≥	  l +1  (to	  protect	  the	  
shuffles).	  	  If	  f	  =	  0,	  then	  the	  number	  of	  rows	  and	  the	  number	  of	  columns	  need	  only	  
be	  l +1,	  as	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  previous	  sections.	  
	  
7. Time	  Requirements	  for	  Creation	  of	  Proof,	  Storage	  Requirements	  
Assume	  that	  the	  number	  n	  of	  ballots	  is	  106,	  the	  number	  of	  tablets	  is	  104,	  and	  that	  
we	  use	  2m	  =	  24.	   	   The	   following	  numbers	  are	   for	  a	   typical	  desktop	  computer	  or	  
laptop,	   which	   can	   execute	   200	   private-­‐key	   operations	   (e.g.	   RSA	   2048-­‐bit)	   per	  
second	  or	  8	  million	  commitments	   (AES	  operations)	  per	  second.	   	  Assume	  that	  PS	  
has	  r=3	  rows	  and	  c=3	  columns.	  
Time	   to	   decrypt	   votes	   from	   tablets:	   	   This	   requires	   104	   private-­‐key	   operations	  
(using	  a	  hybrid	  method)	  per	  first-­‐column	  PS	  device,	  or	  about	  50	  seconds.	  	  It	  also	  
requires	  about	  106	  openings	  of	  pairs	  of	  commitments,	  taking	  under	  a	  second.	  The	  
50	  seconds	  for	  the	  private-­‐key	  operations	  is	  the	  major	  component	  of	  the	  running	  
time.	  	  
The	   last-­‐column	   PS	   devices	   must	   prepare	   24	   arrays	   of	   length	   n	   with	   6	  
commitments	   per	   vote.	   	   The	   running	   time	   required	   is	   about	   18	   seconds	   (six	  
seconds	  if	  the	  last-­‐column	  processors	  do	  this	  in	  parallel).	  	  The	  time	  to	  create	  the	  
random	  permutations	  themselves	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  negligible	  (at	  most	  a	  couple	  of	  
seconds).	  
If	  each	  commitment	  COM(u)	  is	  assumed	  to	  require	  30	  bytes,	  then	  the	  overall	  size	  
of	  the	  proof	  is	  	  about	  25X2X3	  X	  30X106	  bytes	  	  (4.5GB),	  about	  the	  size	  of	  a	  movie;	  
the	  proof	  can	  be	  downloaded	  on	  an	  typical	  internet	  connection	  in	  a	  few	  minutes	  
at	  most,	  and	  checked	  in	  a	  couple	  of	  minutes	  on	  a	  typical	  laptop.	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